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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Repondent,

:
Ca(ge N Q <

GARY ALFRED MITCHESON,
Defendant-Appellant.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The plaintiff-respondent petitions this Court for
rehearing in the above entitled case pursuant to Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, Rule 76(e), for the reasons that (1)
the Court did not consider a material fact in arriving at
its decision, (2) the Court misconstrued the State's
position, and (3) the Court's opinion creates uncertainty in
the law as to the quantum of evidence necessary to mandate
that a requested jury instruction be given.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARL F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
PETITION FOR REHEARING IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE
COURT UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
This Court has previously recognized that to make
an application for a rehearing is a matter of right.
mings v. Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P.619 (1913).

Cum-

Neverthe-

less, plaintiff-respondent recognizes that this right is
not absolute and that a petition for rehearing should not
be utilized to challenge areas of the Court's decision
which respondent merely disagrees with or considers unsatisfactory.

Nor should the rehearing be used to reargue

grounds originally presented.

Cummings v. Nielson, supra;

Beaver County v. Home Indemnity Co., 88 Utah 1, 52 P.2d
435 (1935).

The standard established by this Court in

determining whether a petition for rehearing is proper v/as
expressed long ago in Brown v. Pichard, 4 Utah 292, 11
P. 512, reh. den., 4 Utah 292, 9 P. 573 (1886):
"To justify a court in granting a
rehearing it must be convinced that there
has been a failure to consider some
material point in the case; that there
has been error in the conclusions heretofore arrived at; or that some matter
has been discovered unknown at the time
of the hearing."
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See also Cummings v. Nielson, supra, •
Court stated the
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"Wlien this court. • . has considered and decided all of the
material questions involved in a
•• case, a rehearing should not be
applied for, unless we have misconstrued or overlooked some
material fact or facts, or have
overlooked some statute or decisi 01 i
'which may affect the result, or
that v/e have based the decision, on
some wrong principle of law, or
have either misapplied or overlooked something which materially
affects the result, . , If there
are some reasons.
. • such as we have
indicated above, or other good
reasons, a petition for a rehearing
should be promptly filed, and,
if it is meritorious, its form will
in no case be scrutinized by this
court."
(Emphasis added).
The remaining points of this brief wiVI adequately
?.*~TA: t1 -'•

!

i,-:.- peti 1 :i on for rehear: ng is prope-'l" v^-*"~ve
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unapprehended certain material facts of this case in
"*\ i

i ts deci si on, ai id there are adequa te

reasons' for rehearing tl le case - namely, the L O ^ I L * ^ oi.:/ion
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THE TRIAL COURT.

In its opinion in this case filed February 15,
1977, this Court did not discuss or mention the specific
findings of Judge Edward Sheya of the Carbon County
District Court on the defendants request for an
instruction

on defense of habitation.

According to the

Supplemental Record, which the state did not have
available for inclusion in its original Brief, but which was
filed with the Court on January 5, 1977, and was alluded
to during respondent's oral argument before this Court,
Judge Sheya specifically found that there was not any
evidence to support the requested instruction on defense
of habitation, a defense provided in Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-405 (Supp. 1975).

The following excerpts from

pages three and four of the Supplemental Record clearly
reflect the trial court's position and its concern with
avoiding error:
11

'A person is justified in using
force against another when and to
the extent that he reasonably believes
that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the others unlawful
entry into his habitation. However,
he is justified in the use of force
which is intended or likely to cause
death or serious bodily injury only
if, one, the entry is made or attempted
in a violent and tumultous manner and
he reasonably believes that the entry
is attempted to be made for the purpose
of assaulting or offering personal
violence to any person dwelling or being
therein and that the force is necessary to
prevent the assault or offer of personal
violence.'
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The court, in the first place,
was unable to find from the evidence
that any force was necessary to
prevent anyone's unlawful entry into
the habitation. No one had advanced
to the point where they became an
immediate danger to the habitation.
The evidence as I recall, was the people
were standing, some were standing out
by the truck. Some were standing out in
the road. But I can't recall any evidence
that anyone was advancing menacingly
toward the door. Or was so near the
door that something had to be done to
stop the individual or individuals.
Now on this matter of when you can use
deadly force, the statute says, and the
instruction, of course, quoted the language
of the statute. That th^ entry has to
be made or attempted in a violent and
tumultous manner. Number 1. That is
one element. I can't recall any evidence
to the effect that these people who
came in were engaging in violent or
tumultous conduct. I think he said he
looked out the window and saw these car
lights, but I can't recall evidence which
would support the theory that they entered
in a violent and tumultous manner. So
it seems to me that there is one element
that is missing. And I can't find from
the evidence that the Defendant reasonably
believed that an entry was being attempted
or made for the purpose of assaulting
either himself for anybody in the
dwelling. As has been mentioned, the
argument between these individuals,
the defendant and the deceased and a
brother of the deceased was regarding
tires. He had been forewarned that they
were coming down to retrieve these tires
that were claimed by them. Nothing
was said to the effect we are going to
come down and get you. We are coming down
to do you great bodily injury. We are
coming down to kill you. I can't recall
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any evidence that they were going to
do him any bodily harm or inflict
personal violence upon his person.
Or upon the person of his sister.
I can't recall any evidence to support
that.
Or anyone else in the home, oF
that the Defendant felt it was necessary
that force was necessary, that is
deadly force to prevent the assault or
offer of personal violence. If it
didn't exist, of course, he couldn't
have intended to prevent it. So I
am unable, aside from the fact that
it is inconsistent with the accidental
theory, that aside from that I cannot
see where the evidence supports this
instruction. In that there was no
violent tumultous entry that he could
not have reasonably believed that it
was made, that the entry that was made
was for the purpose of assaulting himself or his sister. Or that he had to
use this force to prevent any such
assault because it didnft exist. So
because the court cou3d see no evidence
to support this instr^^tion, I didn't
want to commit error VJ support this
instruction, I didn't want to commit error
in giving it because our Supreme Court
says it is error to give an instruction
unless the evidence supports it," (Emphasis
added) .
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Although this Court held that it was
reversible error for the trial court not to give
the requested instruction on defense of habitation,
it never refuted or specifically overruled the
trial court's finding that no evidence was submitted
to warrant the instruction.

That leaves the paradoxical

situation of having accepted the trial court's judgment
that no supporting evidence was submitted, yet having
decided that the instruction which therefore has no
evidentiary basis must be given.
Respondent submits that unless or until the
trial court's findings are set aside for error or for
abuse of discretion, the requested instruction was
properly refused by the trial court, requiring this
Court to affirm the conviction.

In State v. Johnson,

112 Utah 130, 185 P.2d 738 (1947), reaffirmed in State
v. Castillo, 23 Utah 2d 70, 457 P.2d 618 (1969), this
Court held that an appropriate instruction on a theory
of the case is required if there is any substantial
evidence to justify giving such an instruction.

Under

this standard, defendant in the instant case was not
entitled to the requested instruction, based on the
trial court's determination that there was not any
supporting evidence.
-7-

POINT III
THE COURT DID NOT ALLUDE TO OR DISCUSS
RESPONDENT'S CHIEF CONTENTION ON THIS APPEAL;
NAMELY, SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY
AN INSTRUCTION ON DEFENSE OF HABITATION.
On page two of the opinion, Justice
Crockett, writing for the Court, said:
"The argument that the
defendant was not entitled to
that instruction is: (1) that
the sister's home was not his
habitation; and (2) that it was
inconsistent with his own
testimony and theory of defense
that the shooting was an accident."
Respondent submits that neither of these theories
articulate the State's argument to this Court
requesting affirmation of the jury verdict.

The

only mention of (1) was at page seven of respondent's
brief:
"Even if, arguendo, this
Court accepted that for purposes
of this statute, appellant's
habitation that evening was his
sister's home, although he was
merely staying the night, appellant
could not surmount other obstacles
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Clearly, respondent did no~b contend that
even under appropriate circumstances, appellant
could not use the defense of habitation defense in
his sister's home; rather, respondent acquiesced to
the theory that another's home could in some situations be appellant's habitation.
The alleged theory (2) of respondent did
not even appear in the State's brief.

While this

apparent inconsistency of defenses was noted by the
trial court and perhaps mentioned before this Court
on oral argument, it was in no sense relied upon
by respondent in its request that Gaify Mitcheson's
conviction for second degree murder be affirmed.
Petitioner-respondent heavily relied upon
and submitted to this Court the theory that defendant
had failed to introduce sufficient competent evidence
at trial to allow the defense of habitation instruction
to be given.

This Court did not meet this critical

issue directly and therefore should grant a rehearing
to consider its merits.
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POINT IV
THE COURT'S OPINION HAS CREATED CONFUSION
ABOUT THE QUANTUM

OF EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO WARRANT

THE SUBMISSION OF A REQUESTED INSTRUCTION TO A JURY.
State v. Castillo, supra, holds that each
party is entitled to have his theory of the case
which is supported by substantial evidence submitted
to the jury.

In the instant case, this Court, by

not mentioning or referring to the trial court's
specific findings on the evidence on this issue, has
left the impression that no evidence or minimal evidence
is all that is required to merit an instruction on a
theory of the case.

Until this Court resolves such

confusion, trial court judges can no longer be sure of
the proper evidentiary standard relating to jury
instructions.

Petitioner-respondent, at the very

least, requests that this Court comment upon the
viability of Castillo in light of the Mitcheson opinion.
CONCLUSION
Because this Court did not address the
State's position and did not directly deal with the
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trial court's findings, confusion over the evidentiary
standard for requested jury instructions has arisen.
Petitioner-respondent therefore requests that a rehearing
be granted to resolve the issues outstanding.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
EARI, F. DORIUS
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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